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Many people seem to think that taxation is like the weather. Everyone talks 
about it but no one does anything about it. This common impression is quite 
wrong for Canada. Even excluding such major upheavals as the 1971 income 
tax revision that followed the report of the Carter Commission, almost every 
year the federal government does something about the tax system: it 
introduces new levies or alters existing taxes by changing their rates or bases. 
Sometimes such changes amount to little more than tinkering. Sometimes 
they indicate major changes in direction. In recent years, provincial 
governments too have made more and more tax policy changes  — 
introducing an incentive here, adjusting a rate or base there, or, occasionally, 
making major changes such as “provincializing” all or some of the property 
tax or changing from a “tax-on-tax” to a “tax-on-base” approach to personal 
income taxation. 
To what extent are such tax policy changes based upon, or supported by, 
economic research? This is the question that we consider in this paper. It is 
an important question, not least because one of the main results emerging 
from much recent research in public economics is that taxes affect economic 
incentives in many complex, sometimes unexpected, and often significant 
ways. One effect of the Carter Commission in the 1960s was that a group of 
serious and well-informed academic analysts of tax policy became established 
in Canadian universities. Did the subsequent output of serious research papers  
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on tax matters affect tax policy?
1 Why do some research results seem to have 
been largely ignored, while others appear to have had much more impact? 
Are there academically respectable ways in which the work of researchers 
might be rendered more productive in terms of public policy impact? These 
are some of the questions raised, if not always answered very satisfactorily, in 




Personal Income Taxes 
 
 
An outstanding feature of Canadian tax policy in the last decade of the 
twentieth century was the extent to which Canada, almost alone among the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries, attacked its deficit problem by increasing the share of personal 
income taxes in gross domestic product (GDP). Despite the importance 
economists typically assign to the incentive effects of income taxes, this trend 
received surprisingly little attention in academic or policy circles through 
much of the period. Although the effects of taxes on out-migration from 
Canada seem small (Helliwell, 1999) relative to their impact on purely 
domestic decision-making, it was more perceptions of a “brain drain” than 
concern for the effects of taxes on the domestic economy that led to tax rates 
becoming a focus of recent political debate. 
                                                             
1An earlier paper touching on this question is Bird and Wilson (1999). 
High marginal tax rates (MTRs) induce a variety of changes in the 
behaviour of taxpayers, with resulting economic costs. Changes in hours 
worked and in labour force participation — the standard preoccupations of 
the theory of income taxation — are, of course, especially important, but tax-
induced changes may also include a variety of tax avoidance devices, such as 
substitution from taxable to non-taxable consumption, changes in the timing 
of income realizations, changes in the form of compensation (including 
incorporation), use of deferred compensation and other tax shelters, and 
increases in tax evasion. Understanding the magnitude of such behavioural 
responses to tax rate changes is critical to forecasting the effects of tax 
reforms on government revenues. It is also essential to measuring the excess 
burden of taxation — the loss in welfare due to the tax system in excess of 
the revenue raised for government.  
As marginal tax rates rose through the 1990s, economists increasingly 
measured their levels and debated their effects on economic activity. Davies 
and Zhang (1996), for instance, analyzed the changes in MTR schedules over  
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the post-war period. They stressed the long upward trend in the average of 
marginal tax rates faced by all taxpayers since 1949, but particularly in the 
1960s and 1970s. Davies (1998) extended the analysis to address recent tax 
reforms. He provides a useful review of the economic principles that might 
guide the design of an income tax system and the evaluation of existing MTR 
schedules. High MTRs are unambiguously undesirable in efficiency terms, as 
they create disincentives to work and pay taxes. On the other hand, although 
high MTRs do not per se increase the progressivity in the tax system, high 
MTRs for some taxpayers are a necessary condition for a progressive income 
tax. If the tax system is to apply low or negative average tax rates to low-
income families and higher average tax rates to those with higher incomes, it 
follows that some taxpayers with intermediate incomes must face h igh 
marginal tax rates.  
These statements may be uncontroversial. Unfortunately, they are also 
not particularly useful. The difficult practical question concerns where in the 
income distribution those high MTRs should be levied. Economists argue 
there are three basic principles that should govern this choice. First, the 
economic cost of a high MTR is proportionally larger the more people there 
are in the relevant tax bracket. Second, the cost of a high MTR is also worse 
the higher the wage rate received by taxpayers in the relevant bracket. 
Although this simply reflects the fact that work disincentives are more costly 
to the economy the more valuable is the labour that is lost, the notion that we 
should spend more time worrying about tax disincentives faced by stock-
brokers than by high school dropouts is not one that goes over well in public 
discussion. Third, a high MTR is more costly when applied to a tax base that 
is more responsive to tax rates — when, for example, affected taxpayers may 
easily substitute from paid work to unpaid family care, or from conventional 
employment to activities in the less-taxed informal sector, or they may even 
move to another country.  
A convenient summary statistic of behavioural responses to taxation is the 
“elasticity of taxable income” proposed by Feldstein (1995) — the average 
percentage decrease in a taxpayer’s taxable income due to all behavioural 
responses when the taxpayer’s marginal share (one minus the marginal tax 
rate) is decreased by 1 per cent. Examining the effects of the 1986 U.S. tax 
reform on a sample of taxpayers, Feldstein estimated the elasticity of taxable 
income to be quite large, with preferred estimates ranging from 1.0 to 1.5. To 
put these estimates in perspective, note that an elasticity of one implies that 
government revenues would reach their maximum level at a tax rate of 50 per 
cent; further tax increases would actually decrease revenues. Feldstein’s work 
might to some extent be viewed as an attempt to give some academic 
respectability to the supply-side arguments of the 1980s. Nonetheless, it  
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provides a useful tool that may help make old arguments about efficiency 
more meaningful and palatable to policymakers. 
Recently, several authors have used similar tools to study the effects of 
taxation in Canada, providing robust evidence of tax avoidance behaviour. 
Silaama and Veall (2001) apply a refined version of Feldstein’s method to 
Canadian data and find evidence of much smaller, though still substantial, 
responsiveness of taxable income to marginal tax rates. Analogous to 
Feldstein’s approach, they look for changes in the reported incomes of a 
group of taxpayers following the 1988 personal tax reform, which flattened 
marginal tax rate schedules. Their point estimate of the elasticity for Canada 
is 0.25.
2 Silaama and Veall also find evidence of far greater responsiveness to 
taxes for the self-employed, for workers nearing retirement age, and for high-
income taxpayers. Gagné, Nadeau and Vaillancourt (2001) adopt a different 
approach. They measure the response to tax rate changes of total taxable 
income in each province and in a number of income ranges for the 1972–96 
period. While their results are not directly comparable to Silaama and Veall’s, 
they also find robust evidence that taxable income responds to tax rate 
changes. Despite this empirical support for the “economists’ prescription” of 
an optimal income tax rate structure sketched above, it is far from clear that 
such arguments have as yet had any significant influence on the tax policy 
debate in Canada. The average MTR has certainly come down over time, but 
the structure of MTRs hardly accords with what analysis suggests. 
                                                             
2Cast in the same “Laffer curve” terms as the Feldstein estimate cited earlier, this 
implies a revenue-maximizing tax rate for Canada of 80 per cent. 
A second major change in Canadian personal income taxation during the 
1990s was the introduction of substantial income-tested tax credits for 
families with children, now known as the National Child Benefit (NCB) 
system. These child tax benefits are “clawed back” from families with 
incomes between about 50 and 80 per cent of median family income at rates 
as high as 30 per cent before applying standard personal income tax rates. 
The result is that high marginal tax rates are no longer the exclusive province 
of high-income taxpayers in Canada. Somewhat similar “claw-back” systems 
are applied to both Employment Insurance (EI) and Old Age Security (OAS) 
payments.   
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The refundable credit system seems to have been conceived at least in 
part as an attempt to integrate the tax treatment of children with provincial 
social assistance and, in the process, dismantle the “welfare wall” that created 
work disincentives for poor families with children. While the policies may 
have such salutary effects — there appears to be no clear evidence one way 
or the other — they may at the same time be bringing the problems of 
traditional welfare programs into the tax system and, increasingly, subjecting 
the average Canadian family  to the perverse incentives that were once 
reserved for welfare recipients.
3 Poschmann and Richards (2000) argue 
forcefully that this is indeed the case. They analyze the clawbacks associated 
with various federal and provincial family benefit programs and show that 
marginal tax rates typically range from 50 to 70 per cent (and are, in some 
cases, even higher), even for moderately low family incomes.  
If clawbacks are indeed driving MTRs too high, two very different 
directions of reform might be contemplated. First, the clawback rates might 
be reduced, mitigating the disincentive effects and spreading them over a 
greater number of taxpayers.
4 Alternatively, and perhaps paradoxically, 
clawback rates could instead be increased, thus concentrating disincentive 
effects on a narrower income band and therefore affecting fewer taxpayers. 
Enhancing the targeting of family benefits in this way might achieve desired 
redistribution while confining MTRs to the places in the income distribution 
where they would do the least harm, in economic (if not necessarily political) 
terms. 
                                                             
3See Battle and Torjman (1994) on the implicit tax rates facing welfare recipients in 
Ontario. 
4This strategy is implicit in the government’s recent decision to raise the break-even 
threshold for the NCB to $35,000, which will reduce MTRs for an affected family with two 
children by about eight percentage points. 
Economists appear divided on this issue. A recent study by the C.D. 
Howe Institute, for example, calls for reductions in clawback rates (Robson, 
Mintz and Poschmann, 2000). Others have expressed caution about this 
tendency for the clawbacks to creep their way up the income distribution 
(Boadway, 1999; Davies, 1999). This debate leads to few definitive 
conclusions. One reason may be because the focus of the recent debate on 
marginal tax rates misses some important complexities in the analysis of 
disincentive effects.  
A high MTR discourages an individual from working additional hours 
(and may have other effects as well, such as on work in the informal or 
underground economy, self-employment, and so on). But the decision as to 
whether to participate in the labour force — and the choice between full-time  
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and part-time work — depends more on the difference in average tax rates 
between low and middle income levels than on the MTRs levied at specific 
points in the distribution. A policy that clawed back more benefits from low 
and middle income families might have undesirable effects on participation, 
particularly of secondary earners. This may be especially true now that the 
federal Working Income Supplement has been abolished.  
The trade-off between disincentives to hours worked and disincentives to 
participation thus needs to be evaluated carefully in designing the tax system. 
Which  effect is more important is fundamentally an empirical matter. 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence for Canada that might inform the 
current debate. In particular, the literature provides no hard evidence about 
the effects of the reforms of the 1990s on the labour supply patterns of 
affected families in Canada. Faute de mieux — and not for the first time — 
policy analysts in Canada must rely on research into the effects of similar 
programs in the United States to assess the impact of family tax benefits. 
Fortunately, the U.S. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) closely resembles 
Canada’s child tax benefits, with a maximum benefit of about C$5,500. The 
EITC generated MTRs in the clawback range in excess of 50 per cent, high 
by U.S. standards, but well below the tax rates currently induced by the 
corresponding Canadian programs. 
To assess the behavioural consequences of the EITC, Eissa and Liebman 
(1996) examined its effects using the “natural experiment” approach that is 
now the workhorse of empirical policy evaluation. In this instance, the idea is 
that the policy change should affect single women with children (who were 
eligible for EITC), but not single women without children. These two groups 
should be affected in about the same way on average by changing labour 
market conditions or other changes during the reform period. The data thus 
provide “treatment” and “control” groups, on the basis of which the separate 
effects of the policy can be discerned. Eissa and Liebman found substantial 
effects on participation by single women with children, relative to that of 
single women without children. At the same time, there was no discernible 
drop in hours worked by mothers already in the labour force, despite the 
disincentives associated with the clawback and the income effects of the 
transfer.
5  
                                                             
5More recently, Meyer and Rosenbaum (2000) found even greater increases in 
participation by single mothers (relative to the appropriate control groups) following much 
larger reforms in incentives during the 1990s.  
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One must of course be careful in applying these results to Canada.
6 For 
example, the labour supply of women is often estimated to be more 
responsive to after-tax wage rates in the United States than in Canada. 
Moreover, the U.S. policy is directed at single mothers, and married women 
with children might respond very differently to the Canadian policy. For 
example, the clawback might influence their choice between full-time and 
part-time work. Nevertheless, there does appear to be good evidence that 
participation responds to tax incentives more than do hours. If so, the high 
MTRs in the current system may be less important than the effects on 
participation that might result from a badly designed targeting system.  
As provincial governments reform their own earned-income supplements, 
following the introduction of the National Child Benefit system and the 
abolition of the federal Working Income Supplement, the need for a closer 
look for concrete evidence about the costs and benefits of this strategy seems 
obvious. This is one area in which policymakers are obviously groping for a 
workable and acceptable solution, and good analysis and empirical evidence 






In part perhaps because many people do not really think of them as taxes, 
governments in Canada have come to rely increasingly on payroll taxes to the 
point where they are now the third most important source of revenue, after 
personal income and sales taxes. Indeed, as Dahlby (1993) reported some 
years ago, payroll taxes have for some time created a larger “tax wedge” for 
workers below median income than do personal income taxes. This trend 
seems certain to continue. Payroll tax rates will be ramped up in future years 
as contribution rates for the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans (CPP/QPP) 
and for provincial workers’ compensation programs are increased. Although 
contribution rates for Employment Insurance, in contrast, are still near 
cyclical highs and are likely to decrease in future, a net increase in payroll 
taxes seems inevitable.
7 
                                                             
6For a more extensive review of this literature and its implications for Canada, see 
Mendelson (1997). 
7In addition, several provinces (particularly Quebec) levy payroll taxes on 
employers. These taxes too may creep up over time.  
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Perhaps in part because tax lawyers and accountants have not been much 
concerned with payroll taxes, economists have, unusually, played a leading 
role in the debate over payroll taxation. Fortunately, payroll taxes are 
particularly amenable to empirical analysis. Much of the work which has been 
done has focused on determining the economic incidence of payroll taxes and 
their effects on employment. In the simplest terms, a payroll tax reduces 
employers’ demand for labour, which may result in a fall in after-tax wages, if 
labour is supplied inelastically, or in a fall in employment, if labour supply is 
relatively elastic.  
Business groups in Canada have tended to stress the employment effects 
of the tax, decrying payroll taxes as “job killers”. In his work for the Ontario 
Fair Tax Commission, Dahlby (1993) pointed out that this effect was often 
overstated, however. Surveying previous evidence on the elasticities of labour 
supply and demand, he argued that labour likely bears more than 80 per cent 
of the burden of payroll taxes in the long run. In other words, the total 
compensation costs paid by employers are largely unaffected by payroll taxes, 
so that the employment effects of such taxes should be correspond-ingly 
small.  
Direct empirical evidence for Canada reaches a more mixed conclusion. 
Di Matteo and Shannon (1995) used annual time-series data to estimate the 
impact of all taxes, including payroll taxes, on real wages and employment in 
Canada. According to their estimates, the burden of payroll tax increases is 
approximately equally shared between labour and employers. A 1 per cent 
rise in the payroll tax rate would cause real after-tax wages to fall by 0.44 per 
cent and employment to fall by 0.32 per cent. While these estimates may not 
be particularly robust, they suggest a greater impact of payroll taxation on 
employment than Dahlby’s study.  
Of course, the economic effects of payroll taxes are unlikely to be much 
different on average than those of personal income or, for that matter, sales 
taxes (although there is no evidence that this thought has influenced tax 
policy). All these taxes drive a similar wedge between the cost of labour to 
employers and the return to employment of workers. In some respects, 
however, payroll taxes seem likely to have effects not shared by other taxes 
on labour and are worthy of further study.  
The ceiling provisions in the major federal payroll tax systems (CPP/ 
QPP and EI), for example, imply the taxes are distortionary only for workers 
with below-average earnings. For workers above the ceilings, although 
contributions are still a tax on employment, they act as lump-sum taxes, with 
no impact on the return to additional hours worked. Coupled with the 
evidence on wage and employment effects cited above, this suggests that the 
current structure of payroll taxes may be one factor contributing to rising  
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wage inequality among Canadian workers. In addition, it may also encourage 
employment of high-wage, full-time workers, at the expense of low-wage and 
part-time workers (Lin, Picot and Beach, 1996).  
On the other hand, some payroll taxes act to a certain extent as benefit 
taxes, in that the benefits accruing to workers from additional hours of 
employment are roughly commensurate with additional tax liabilities. If the 
link from benefits to contributions were exact, then such taxes would in 
principle have no distortionary effect on employment decisions. In practice, 
however, some distortions inevitably persist, since contribution rates are not 
actuarially fair for individual workers and tax increases are often not linked to 
corresponding benefit increases. Nevertheless, some payroll taxes, where the 
link between contributions and benefits is strongest, may have different 
effects than others owing to this benefit connection. For instance, Vaillancourt 
and Marceau (1990), found some evidence that the incidence of workers’ 
compensation taxes was different than for other payroll taxes, a finding which 
they attributed to its benefit tax element. This line of thought also suggests 
that a case can be made for earmarking payroll taxes for con-tributory social 
insurance programs, a practice that has otherwise received little support from 
economists.
8 
                                                             
8For a discussion of earmarking in Canada, see Thirsk and Bird (1994). 
One way or another, payroll taxes seem likely to constitute a larger part 
of the tax mix in Canada in future years, regardless of the findings of 
economists. In the future, however, such findings may perhaps play a more 
important role than they have in the past in determining the magnitude of the 




Taxes on Corporations  
 
 
Since corporate tax policy in Canada has recently been discussed in detail in 
the Mintz report (Canada, 1998), not to mention its many supporting 
technical papers, and since Professor Mintz himself is contributing a paper on 
taxes and savings to this volume, we shall not dwell on this subject here. We 
simply note that recent economic discussion of the corporate income tax has 
strongly supported on efficiency grounds the move towards base broadening 
and rate flattening advocated in the Mintz report and that  these 
recommendations have been further urged by the growing concern with 
international tax competition. While the latter argument seems stronger in  
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rhetoric than in evidence, Canada, like most countries, appears to have largely 
accepted these recommendations in principle, if not yet fully in practice.  
It is easy to show that at the margin investment decisions with respect to 
industry, location, risk-taking, asset mix, and timing may be influenced by 
variations in effective tax rates. It is equally easy to show that choices with 
respect to organizational form, financial structure, and dividend policy may be 
equally distorted by tax policy. Many economists (e.g., Vickrey, 1991) have 
drawn the conclusion from such considerations that there is no place for a 
separate tax on corporate income in a sensible tax system, as indeed did the 
Carter report.  
The case against taxing corporations has not been accepted so far in any 
country. Close examination (e.g., Bird, 1996) suggests that there are several 
good reasons to maintain separate taxes on corporations. Nonetheless, the 
case for reducing and to some extent restructuring such taxes has generally 
been accepted in recent years at both the federal and provincial levels. It is 
interesting to speculate whether this acceptance reflects the persuasiveness of 
economic argument, the politically powerful interests of capitalists, or some 
other factor. Suggestions have also been made that, while rates may continue 
their downward trend, bases may again be narrowed through incentives as 
governments continue their ceaseless search for instruments by which to 
satisfy their apparent need to be seen to “do something” for politically 
influential groups. 
More interesting, and more peculiar to Canada, has been the growth of 
non-income taxes on corporations, notably capital taxes, over the last decade 
or so. As the Mintz report shows, for many firms such taxes are now often 
more important than corporate income taxes, especially in years in which 
profits are not rising rapidly. One way in which Canadian governments have 
made up for the relative decline of corporate income tax revenues has been 
by imposing new, less profit-sensitive taxes on corporations. While Bird and 
Mintz (2000) have noted that there may be arguments supporting such taxes 
in some instances, it is hard to understand the rise of capital taxation in 
Canada other than as another proof of the adage that the easiest taxes to 
impose are those of which most people are not aware, those that can, if 
discovered, be said to penalize the rich and large, and those that no one is 
really sure who pays. Ignorance, it appears, may at times play as important a 










In terms of public perception, if not in revenue terms, undoubtedly the major 
change in Canadian tax policy in the last decade was the introduction of the 
Goods and Services Tax (GST) to replace the old Manufacturers’ Sales Tax 
(MST). Economists entered fairly vigorously into the discussion preceding the 
GST, as usual expounding various views. While most economists, unlike 
most other participants in the debate, seemed generally sympathetic both to 
consumption taxes and to the less distorting effects of the GST compared to 
other forms of indirect taxation,  some favoured payroll taxes instead 
(Kesselman, 1993), some appear to have favoured some other form of 
reformed sales tax (Whalley and Fretz, 1990), and some were concerned 
mainly to show that the GST would be either more or less regressive than 
some other tax to which it was compared.
9  
 
Unusually, the contribution of economists to the GST was, in the end, 
decisive. After all, despite the many deficiencies in the GST as finally adopted 
(Bird, 1994), the evidence seems incontrovertible that the GST was 
economically less distorting than its predecessor the MST (Kuo, McGirr and 
Poddar, 1988). Indeed, since this was the only clear gain from introducing the 
GST, it may be argued that the Mulroney government was the first — and 
probably the last — in Canadian history willing to sacrifice itself on the altar 
of economic efficiency. As usual, of course, much of the public discussion of 
the GST focused not on efficiency issues, but on equity issues. While 
economists argued on both sides of this issue also, it seems fair to say that 
their contribution in showing, on the basis of plausible assumptions, that the 
tax was not seriously regressive helped carry the day.
10 All in all, regardless of 
what thinks of the GST, its adoption stands as probably the single most 
important example to date of the influence of economists on Canadian tax 
policy. 
                                                             
9See, for example, Grady (1990, 1991); Gillespie (1991a); and Ruggeri, Van Wart 
and Howard (1994a). 
10The importance of the distributional issue is illustrated by the “double whammy” 
of offsetting policies introduced when the GST was implemented. Although the refundable 
GST credit allowed under the income tax was sufficient to offset the estimated regressivity of 
the tax, political pressure led to the exemption also of so-called “basic foods” on distributive 
grounds, thus substantially reducing the efficiency gains from the tax.  
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The situation is quite different with respect to property taxes. Although 
relatively little serious economic research has been carried out in Canada with 
respect to this tax in recent years,
11 such research has continued to be a major 
industry below the border, to the point where lengthy review articles debating 
the s ignificance and interpretation of the results have recently appeared 
(Zodrow, 2001; Fischel, 2001). One conclusion to be drawn from these 
reviews is that there is still much to learn about this oldest of taxes. Another, 
however, is that it is hard to detect much, if any, effect on actual tax policy 
either south or north of the border as a result of all this research. None of the 
major changes that have taken place in property tax policy in provinces such 
as Ontario in recent years, for example, seem to reflect any concern for the 
issue at the heart of the academic discussion of property taxation — the 
question of the benefit linkage between local property taxes and local public 
services, for example — or to demonstrate any knowledge of that literature.
12 
The failure to consider research results in developing tax policy is equally 
marked with respect to the other ancient tax that still generates significant 
revenue for governments in Canada, namely, excises. Countless studies — 
though again few in Canada — have considered the efficiency effects of taxes 
on alcoholic beverages and tobacco,
13 but such studies have had little 
perceptible effect on either the level or structure of these taxes. Much the 
same is true with respect to taxes on vehicles and fuel, despite the substantial 
economic literature suggesting alternative designs of these levies on efficiency 
grounds. In this, as in most fields of taxation, it appears that perceived effects 
on equity and political considerations have trumped, and probably always will 
trump, efficiency analysis  — even if, as has, alas, seldom been true of 
academic studies, the latter is presented to policymakers in both language and 
a context to which they can relate.  
 
A last example may be mentioned. While it appears that the advice of 
economists counted for nothing when Canada led the way in the world by 
abolishing all estate and inheritance taxes,
14 it seems to have been heeded 
                                                             
11For a review of earlier studies, see Bird and Slack (1978). 
12In the Ontario case, this is particularly striking because the issue was thoroughly 
discussed in, for example, Kitchen and Slack (1993). 
13For a recent survey of the latter, see Cnossen (2001). A rare Canadian example 
is Raynauld and Vidal (1992). 
14For the most recent Canadian review of the issues, see Mintz and Pesando 
(1991). The rest of the world continues to find this subject worthy of study, however, as  
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amazingly quickly recently with respect to the capital gains taxes, the 
introduction of which was the stated rationale for abolishing taxes on wealth 
at death. In particular, Mintz and Wilson (2000) was hardly in press when its 
major recommendation, to reduce the capital gains inclusion rate, was put into 
place — and then a few months later strengthened. As in the case of the 
corporate income tax, however, one may question the extent to which such 
economic advice influenced the outcome, compared to the politically 
attractive rhetoric with respect to encouraging savings and investment on one 







What lessons do we draw from the preceding rather dismal tale of the 
apparent lack of success of the dismal science in influencing Canadian tax 
policy in recent years? 
The first lesson is, of course, that the tale is not really all that dismal. The 
glass, it may be argued, is at least half full. The downward pressure on 
personal and corporate income tax rates has certainly been supported, if not 
initiated, by the increasing evidence of the distortions caused by high marginal 
tax rates. Equally, the adoption of the GST can be explained only by the 
(possibly irrational) acceptance of the federal government of the economic 
argument that Canada had to change to a value-added tax to reduce economic 
distortions.
16 
                                                                                                                                        
evidenced in Pestieau and Poterba (2001).  
15One rationale for the first reduction in the inclusion rate (in February 2000) was to 
level out the taxes on dividends and capital gains and hence to restore a certain logic to the 
personal taxation of corporate-source income.  Of course, the further reduction in July 2000 
created an imbalance in the other direction and again made the system analytically incoherent.  
16Admittedly, politicians may have been more influenced by the mercantilist 
argument that the former sales tax “taxed exports”. 
A second lesson, however, is that too much weight should not be 
attached to the first lesson, because equally convincing (or unconvincing) 
economic studies of the damage done by poorly-designed excise, property, 
and payroll taxes do not seem to have met with a similarly receptive audience. 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the adoption of the flatter-rate broader-
base income tax strategy is probably better explained by more fundamental 
political economy considerations than by simple acceptance of the advice of  
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economists. If so, as we have already suggested, the GST stands as the major 
evidence of successful economic advice in the tax area in recent decades — a 
conclusion that may not make everyone happy and that, to say the least, does 
not augur well for future success. Politicians who saw the fate of the 
Progressive Conservative party in the post-GST election will probably be 
even less likely in the future than in the past to pay much attention to the 
advice of “efficiency technicians”.  
More positively, however, three other lessons may perhaps be drawn 
from the broader post-war experience.
17 The first such lesson is that tax 
economists who want to influence public policy must pay more attention to 
the issues that motivate policymakers, even if this means that they may pay 
somewhat less attention to the techniques that lead to publishable academic 
papers. This is not a plea for “dumbing down” policy analysis. On the 
contrary, it is a plea to smarten it up.  
In particular, analysis that assumes distributional considerations are either 
unimportant or can easily be accommodated by (unspecified) adjust-ments 
somewhere else in the tax-transfer system simply does not resonate in the 
policy context. Distributional issues matter in tax policy. In fact, often such 
issues dominate in the minds of those who shape that policy. From this 
perspective, the general failure of policy economists to say anything very 
useful about distributional issues has often relegated them, and their evidence, 
to the sidelines in policy discussion.  
Distributional studies such as those in papers by Vermaeten, Gillespie and 
Vermaeten (1994); and Ruggieri, Van Wart and Howard (1994b) are 
decidedly out of academic fashion. This is understandable because they are 
both conceptually and empirically difficult and, as Whalley (1984) memor-
ably demonstrated, extremely assumption-sensitive. But equity continues to 
lie at the heart of public economics, and unless and until economists can deal 
more explicitly and satisfactorily with this issue, their success record in 
influencing public policy seems unlikely to improve much. 
A second lesson, as Winer and Hettich (1999) set out at length in 
theoretical terms and to some extent demonstrate empirically (see also 
Gillespie, 1991b), is that tax policy is not just about economics but about 
politics. We must understand the political economy of taxation if we are to 
understand how economic analyses of tax issues are likely to be perceived to 
affect policy outcomes. Scholars such as Persson and Tabellini (2000) and 
Besley and Coate (1997) have made major contributions to this field of study 
                                                             
17For a more comprehensive review of postwar experience, see Bird, Perry and 
Wilson (1998).   
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in recent years.
18 But there is clearly much more that can and should be done 
to understand both how the present system works and how it might be altered 
to improve policy outcomes in economic terms.
19 Some years ago, for 
example, St. Hilaire and Whalley (1985) made a number of interesting 
suggestions with respect to how tax reform might be institutionalized to make 
better use of evidence and produce better results. It seems past time to return 
to this line of inquiry and to attempt to apply some of the political insights of 
such Canadian scholars as Winer and Hettich (1999); Hartle (1988); and 
Breton (1996) to the problem of formulating tax policy in a democratic setting 
in light of the best scientific knowledge instead of leaving it, as is now 
generally the case, to the shifting winds of political fashion. 
Finally, it may not be out of place to note that if one wishes to affect 
policy, one must normally write in a way, and in a forum, that will come to 
the notice of policymakers. Scholars such as Hartle and Mintz, to mention 
only two prominent examples, have not hesitated to engage in public 
discussion of key policy issues and to attempt to convince wider audiences of 
the cogency and importance of the economic analysis of taxation. While not 
everyone — the present authors, for two — may be constitutionally up to the 
personal costs imposed by this approach — and, of course, current academic 
mores render such involvement virtually ultra vires for those aspiring to 
tenure in academic departments of economics, it is, we think, only through 
such efforts to communicate to policymakers directly or indirectly by 
engaging with the (small) informed public with which policymakers interact 
that progress is likely to be made.
20  
                                                             
18McKenzie (2001) has recently reviewed this literature from a Canadian 
perspective. 
19See, for quite different perspectives on the Canadian tax policy process, Good 
(1980); and McQuaig (1987). 
20To put this another way, we are in effect supporting the view of Harberger (1993) 
that economists need to pay more attention to their role as policy practitioners if they are to 
play that role more effectively. Of course, some very deep waters are being skated over 
rather quickly here: see, for example, the fundamental study of Lindblom (1990) on the role 
of social scientists in the policy process. 
Like the scholars we have mentioned, David Slater has for many years 
epitomized the best of this tradition in his scholarship, in his willingness to be 
involved in the policy process, and, not least, in his role in recent years in 
developing the important policy forum that Canadian Business Economics has 
become. It is only through such efforts that the gap between scholarship and 
policy action will ever be bridged in the area of taxation, or any other area of 
public policy.  
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